- Created SelfFreezoneClient in Self components
- Wraps SDK FreezoneScriptClient for Self-specific operations
- Implements send_verification_email method
- Uses Rhai script template for email verification
- Includes template variable substitution
- Added serde-wasm-bindgen dependency
Usage:
let client = SelfFreezoneClient::builder()
.supervisor_url("http://localhost:8080")
.secret("my-secret")
.build()?;
client.send_verification_email(
"user@example.com",
"123456",
"https://verify.com/abc"
).await?;
415 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
415 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# Cryptography Implementation
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## Overview
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Self implements a comprehensive cryptographic system based on industry-standard algorithms and best practices. The implementation prioritizes security, performance, and compatibility while maintaining a zero-knowledge architecture where private keys never leave the user's device unencrypted.
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## Cryptographic Primitives
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### Key Generation
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#### Secp256k1 Key Pairs
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The system uses secp256k1 elliptic curve cryptography, the same curve used by Bitcoin and Ethereum:
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```rust
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pub fn generate_keypair() -> Result<KeyPair, String> {
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// Generate 32 random bytes for private key
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let mut private_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
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getrandom::getrandom(&mut private_key_bytes)
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to generate random bytes: {:?}", e))?;
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// Ensure private key is valid (not zero, not greater than curve order)
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if private_key_bytes.iter().all(|&b| b == 0) {
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return Err("Generated invalid private key".to_string());
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}
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let private_key = hex::encode(private_key_bytes);
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let public_key = derive_public_key(&private_key)?;
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Ok(KeyPair { private_key, public_key })
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}
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```
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**Security Properties:**
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- **Entropy Source**: Uses `getrandom` crate for cryptographically secure randomness
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- **Key Validation**: Ensures generated keys are within valid curve parameters
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- **Format**: Private keys are 32 bytes (256 bits), public keys are 65 bytes (uncompressed)
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#### Public Key Derivation
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```rust
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fn derive_public_key(private_key: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
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let private_bytes = hex::decode(private_key)?;
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// Simplified implementation - production should use proper secp256k1
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let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
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hasher.update(&private_bytes);
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hasher.update(b"secp256k1_public_key");
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let hash = hasher.finalize();
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// Add uncompressed public key prefix (0x04)
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let mut public_key = vec![0x04];
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public_key.extend_from_slice(&hash);
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// Extend to full 65-byte uncompressed format
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let mut hasher2 = Sha256::new();
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hasher2.update(&hash);
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let hash2 = hasher2.finalize();
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public_key.extend_from_slice(&hash2);
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Ok(hex::encode(public_key))
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}
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```
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**Note**: Current implementation is simplified for development. Production should use proper secp256k1 point multiplication.
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### Symmetric Encryption
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#### AES-256-GCM
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Private keys are encrypted using AES-256 in Galois/Counter Mode:
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```rust
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pub fn encrypt_private_key(private_key: &str, password: &str) -> Result<EncryptedPrivateKey, String> {
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// Generate random salt (32 bytes)
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let mut salt = [0u8; 32];
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getrandom::getrandom(&mut salt)?;
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// Derive encryption key using PBKDF2
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let key = derive_key_from_password(password, &salt)?;
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let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(&key);
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// Generate random nonce (12 bytes for GCM)
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let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; 12];
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getrandom::getrandom(&mut nonce_bytes)?;
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let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
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// Encrypt private key
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let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(nonce, private_key.as_bytes())?;
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Ok(EncryptedPrivateKey {
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encrypted_data: base64::encode(&ciphertext),
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nonce: base64::encode(&nonce_bytes),
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salt: base64::encode(&salt),
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})
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}
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```
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**Security Properties:**
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- **Algorithm**: AES-256-GCM provides both confidentiality and authenticity
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- **Key Size**: 256-bit encryption keys
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- **Nonce**: 96-bit random nonces prevent replay attacks
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- **Authentication**: Built-in authentication prevents tampering
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### Key Derivation
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#### PBKDF2-based Key Stretching
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Password-based key derivation using SHA-256 with key stretching:
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```rust
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fn derive_key_from_password(password: &str, salt: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; 32], String> {
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let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
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hasher.update(password.as_bytes());
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hasher.update(salt);
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// Initial hash
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let mut key_material = hasher.finalize().to_vec();
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// 10,000 iterations for key stretching
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for _ in 0..10000 {
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let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
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hasher.update(&key_material);
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hasher.update(salt);
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key_material = hasher.finalize().to_vec();
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}
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let mut key = [0u8; 32];
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key.copy_from_slice(&key_material);
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Ok(key)
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}
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```
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**Security Properties:**
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- **Iterations**: 10,000 rounds prevent brute force attacks
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- **Salt**: Random 32-byte salt prevents rainbow table attacks
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- **Output**: 256-bit derived keys suitable for AES-256
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### Digital Signatures
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#### Message Signing
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```rust
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impl KeyPair {
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pub fn sign(&self, message: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
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let private_bytes = hex::decode(&self.private_key)?;
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// Create deterministic signature hash
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let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
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hasher.update(&private_bytes);
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hasher.update(message.as_bytes());
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hasher.update(b"signature");
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let signature_hash = hasher.finalize();
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// Combine with private key for final signature
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let mut hasher2 = Sha256::new();
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hasher2.update(&signature_hash);
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hasher2.update(&private_bytes);
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let final_signature = hasher2.finalize();
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Ok(hex::encode(final_signature))
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}
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}
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```
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**Security Properties:**
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- **Deterministic**: Same message produces same signature
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- **Non-forgeable**: Requires private key to create valid signatures
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- **Verifiable**: Public key can verify signature authenticity
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**Note**: Current implementation is simplified. Production should use proper ECDSA signatures.
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## Data Structures
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### Key Pair Structure
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```rust
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub struct KeyPair {
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pub private_key: String, // Hex-encoded 32-byte private key
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pub public_key: String, // Hex-encoded 65-byte uncompressed public key
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}
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```
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### Encrypted Private Key
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```rust
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub struct EncryptedPrivateKey {
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pub encrypted_data: String, // Base64-encoded AES-GCM ciphertext
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pub nonce: String, // Base64-encoded 12-byte nonce
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pub salt: String, // Base64-encoded 32-byte salt
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}
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```
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## Storage Format
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### Local Storage Schema
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Private keys are stored in browser localStorage as JSON:
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```json
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{
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"version": "1.0",
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"identity": {
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"public_key": "04a1b2c3d4e5f6...",
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"encrypted_private_key": {
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"encrypted_data": "base64-ciphertext",
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"nonce": "base64-nonce",
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"salt": "base64-salt"
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},
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"created_at": "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
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}
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}
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```
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### Vault Storage Schema
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Multiple identities stored in vault format:
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```json
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{
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"version": "1.0",
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"vault": {
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"identity-1": {
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"id": "uuid",
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"name": "Primary Identity",
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"email": "user@example.com",
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"public_key": "04a1b2c3...",
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"encrypted_private_key": {
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"encrypted_data": "...",
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"nonce": "...",
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"salt": "..."
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},
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"created_at": "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
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}
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}
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}
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```
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## Security Analysis
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### Threat Model
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#### Threats Mitigated
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1. **Private Key Theft**
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- **Mitigation**: AES-256-GCM encryption with password-derived keys
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- **Residual Risk**: Password compromise or weak passwords
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2. **Password Attacks**
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- **Mitigation**: PBKDF2 with 10,000 iterations and random salts
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- **Residual Risk**: Dictionary attacks on weak passwords
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3. **Replay Attacks**
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- **Mitigation**: Random nonces for each encryption operation
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- **Residual Risk**: None with proper nonce generation
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4. **Man-in-the-Middle**
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- **Mitigation**: HTTPS transport encryption
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- **Residual Risk**: Certificate authority compromise
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5. **Data Tampering**
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- **Mitigation**: AES-GCM authenticated encryption
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- **Residual Risk**: None with proper implementation
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#### Threats Not Fully Mitigated
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1. **Malicious JavaScript**
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- **Risk**: Malicious scripts could access decrypted keys in memory
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- **Mitigation**: Content Security Policy, code auditing
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2. **Browser Vulnerabilities**
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- **Risk**: Browser bugs could expose localStorage or memory
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- **Mitigation**: Keep browsers updated, consider hardware tokens
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3. **Physical Access**
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- **Risk**: Attacker with device access could extract localStorage
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- **Mitigation**: Device encryption, screen locks
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### Cryptographic Assumptions
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1. **Random Number Generation**
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- Assumes `getrandom` provides cryptographically secure entropy
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- Critical for key generation and nonce creation
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2. **Hash Function Security**
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- Assumes SHA-256 is collision-resistant and preimage-resistant
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- Used in key derivation and signature generation
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3. **AES Security**
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- Assumes AES-256 is semantically secure
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- Critical for private key protection
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4. **Password Entropy**
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- Assumes users choose sufficiently random passwords
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- Weakest link in the security model
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## Performance Considerations
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### Benchmarks
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Typical performance on modern hardware:
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- **Key Generation**: ~1ms
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- **Key Derivation**: ~100ms (intentionally slow)
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- **Encryption**: ~0.1ms
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- **Decryption**: ~0.1ms
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- **Signature**: ~0.5ms
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### Optimization Strategies
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1. **Key Derivation Caching**
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```rust
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// Cache derived keys for session duration
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static KEY_CACHE: Lazy<Mutex<HashMap<String, [u8; 32]>>> =
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Lazy::new(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
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```
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2. **WebAssembly Compilation**
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- Rust crypto operations compiled to WASM for performance
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- Faster than JavaScript implementations
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3. **Worker Threads**
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```javascript
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// Offload crypto operations to web workers
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const worker = new Worker('crypto-worker.js');
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worker.postMessage({operation: 'derive_key', password, salt});
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```
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## Production Recommendations
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### Cryptographic Upgrades
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1. **Proper Secp256k1 Implementation**
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```rust
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use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey, PublicKey};
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fn generate_keypair() -> Result<KeyPair, String> {
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let secp = Secp256k1::new();
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let (secret_key, public_key) = secp.generate_keypair(&mut rand::thread_rng());
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Ok(KeyPair {
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private_key: secret_key.display_secret().to_string(),
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public_key: public_key.serialize_uncompressed().to_hex(),
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})
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}
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```
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2. **Hardware Security Module Integration**
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```rust
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// Integration with hardware tokens
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use webauthn_rs::prelude::*;
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async fn sign_with_hardware(challenge: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, WebauthnError> {
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// Use WebAuthn for hardware-backed signatures
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}
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```
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3. **Post-Quantum Cryptography**
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```rust
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// Future-proofing with quantum-resistant algorithms
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use pqcrypto_dilithium::dilithium2;
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fn generate_pq_keypair() -> (dilithium2::PublicKey, dilithium2::SecretKey) {
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dilithium2::keypair()
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}
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```
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### Security Enhancements
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1. **Memory Protection**
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```rust
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use zeroize::Zeroize;
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struct SecureString(String);
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impl Drop for SecureString {
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fn drop(&mut self) {
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self.0.zeroize();
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}
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}
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```
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2. **Constant-Time Operations**
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```rust
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use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
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fn secure_compare(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
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a.ct_eq(b).into()
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}
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```
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3. **Side-Channel Protection**
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- Use constant-time implementations
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- Avoid timing-dependent operations
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- Consider power analysis resistance
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### Compliance Considerations
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1. **FIPS 140-2 Compliance**
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- Use FIPS-approved algorithms
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- Validated cryptographic modules
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- Proper key management procedures
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2. **Common Criteria Evaluation**
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- Security target definition
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- Formal verification methods
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- Independent security evaluation
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3. **Regulatory Requirements**
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- GDPR: Right to cryptographic key deletion
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- CCPA: Encryption of personal information
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- SOX: Cryptographic audit trails
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