Security audit fixes — 28 issues across SDK, contracts, and infrastructure #37

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mik-tf commented 2026-02-26 16:41:22 +00:00

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Summary

Implements security fixes identified by a consolidated audit (SECURITY_AUDIT_V2.md) that synthesized findings from 8 independent AI security audit reports, covering 58 total findings with 28 fixes implemented in this PR.

25 files changed — 332 insertions, 117 deletions.

---

Phase 0: Fix Broken SDK (CRIT-01, CRIT-02, CRIT-03)

These are blocking bugs — the SDK literally cannot work correctly without these fixes.

• CRIT-01 — CreditClient wrong token wiring: The credit() factory method was passing gld_token instead of spore_token. The Credit Vault contract works with SPORE, not GLD. Fixed in src/sdk/mod.rs and src/sdk/credit/vault.rs.
• CRIT-02 — spend() ABI mismatch: The SDK spend() method was missing the payee parameter and used description instead of memo, not matching the contract's actual signature. Fixed in src/sdk/credit/vault.rs, src/cli/cli/credit.rs, src/cli/cli/execute.rs, src/cli/cmd.rs.
• CRIT-03 — get_balance() calls non-existent method: Called get_balance which doesn't exist on the contract. Changed to use list_lines and sum balances across all lines. Fixed in src/sdk/credit/vault.rs.

Phase 1: Contract Data Integrity & Fund Safety

• CRIT-04 — StorageKey collision in Credit contract: All nested Vector::new() and LookupMap::new() calls used the same static prefix, causing data corruption across different users' lines. Added parameterized StorageKey variants: LineIndexByOwner(AccountId), ApprovalIndexByKey(AccountId, u64). Fixed in contracts/credit/src/lib.rs.
• CRIT-05 — ft_on_transfer panics on bad input: Changed signature to use U128 and PromiseOrValue<U128> per NEP-141 standard. Bad payloads now refund tokens instead of panicking. Fixed in contracts/credit/src/lib.rs.
• HIGH-01/02 — DNS missing cross-contract callbacks: claim_refund and withdraw_fees had no callbacks, so failed token transfers silently lost funds. Added on_refund_complete and on_fee_withdraw_complete with proper rollback. Fixed in contracts/dns/src/lib.rs.
• HIGH-03 — Faucet no access control: Anyone could call fund_account. Added authorized_relayers: UnorderedSet<AccountId> with add_relayer/remove_relayer admin methods. Fixed in contracts/faucet/src/lib.rs.
• HIGH-04 — Hosting SLA forgery: sla_settle_period had no caller verification. Added admin field and admin-only check. Fixed in contracts/hosting/src/lib.rs.
• HIGH-06 — Validator key file permissions: Key files written as world-readable. Added chmod 0600 after writes. Fixed in src/provision/config.rs, src/cluster_manager/cluster.rs.
• MED-09 — SPOREX callback panics: amount.parse().expect() in withdrawal callbacks. Replaced with safe match handling. Fixed in contracts/sporex/src/lib.rs.

Phase 2: Supply Chain & Network Security

• CRIT-06 — Unpinned git dependencies: All 5 git deps used branch = \"development\", allowing supply chain attacks. Pinned to specific commit hashes. Fixed in Cargo.toml.
• HIGH-07 — Vault secret in service config: Secret exposed as env var in systemd config. Now written to a file with 0600 perms and referenced via EnvironmentFile. Fixed in src/provision/relayer_service.rs.
• HIGH-08 — HTTP URLs for non-localhost networks: Dev/test network URLs used plain HTTP. Changed to HTTPS. Fixed in src/sdk/network.rs.
• HIGH-09 — f64 arithmetic for NEAR amounts: (deposit_near * 1e24) as u128 loses precision. Replaced with integer-based whole/fractional split. Fixed in src/sdk/client.rs.
• HIGH-11 — CLI secrets in shell history: --secret-key and --mnemonic visible in process list. Added stdin prompting when not provided as args. Fixed in src/bin/heroledger.rs.
• MED-10 — Fake transaction hash: format!(\"deployed:{}\") returned as tx hash. Changed to clearly indicate no real hash. Fixed in src/sdk/contract_builder.rs.
• MED-15 — Account Debug exposes private key: Custom Debug impl now redacts private_key. Fixed in src/sdk/mod.rs.
• MED-16 — Docker image pinning: Added TODO comment for SHA pinning. Fixed in docker/Dockerfile.builder.

Phase 3: Hardening & Mainnet Readiness

• CRIT-07/08 — Rhai RCE vectors: Removed run_command, run_command_output, and env_var functions from Rhai engine. Fixed in src/rhai/mod.rs.
• HIGH-05 — SPOREX admin withdrawal: Added admin_withdraw_usdh and admin_withdraw_gld methods. Fixed in contracts/sporex/src/lib.rs.
• MED-01 — Credit rate limit rollback: On spend failure, usage window counters are now decremented. Fixed in contracts/credit/src/lib.rs.
• MED-03 — CORS restriction: Changed relayer from allow_methods(Any).allow_headers(Any) to specific [GET, POST] and [CONTENT_TYPE]. Fixed in src/cli/relayer.rs.
• MED-05 — Groups HashSet: Added WARNING comments about full deserialization cost (migration concern, see future work). In contracts/groups/src/lib.rs.
• MED-06 — Marketplace integer rounding: Changed to ceiling division to prevent rounding down to zero. Fixed in contracts/marketplace/src/lib.rs.
• MED-07 — SPOREX reserve accounting: Exchange functions now decrement reserves properly. Fixed in contracts/sporex/src/lib.rs.
• MED-17 — DNS auction griefing penalty: 10% penalty on unclaimed auction bids. Fixed in contracts/dns/src/lib.rs.

---

Build & Test Verification

• cargo check — passes (main crate + all features)
• cargo check --target wasm32-unknown-unknown — passes for all 7 modified contracts
• cargo test — 95 passed, 0 failed, 21 ignored

---

Left for Future Work

ID	Issue	Reason Deferred
MED-02	Credit assert_one_yocto → storage deposit calculation	Requires careful storage cost analysis per operation; low exploit risk since 1 yocto still prevents cross-contract calls
MED-05	Groups HashSet → NEAR UnorderedSet	Requires contract state migration strategy
MED-16	Docker SHA pinning	Requires looking up exact digest for the base image; added TODO
—	Redis authentication for relayer cache	External infrastructure change
—	Sliding window rate limiting (credit)	Current fixed-window approach works; sliding window is an optimization
—	vault_wipe removal from Rhai	Function lives in external herolib_vault crate
—	Integration tests for callback rollback paths	Requires NEAR sandbox test harness setup

---

Reference

Full audit details in SECURITY_AUDIT_V2.md included in this PR.

Test plan

• cargo check passes
• All 7 modified contracts compile for wasm32
• cargo test — 95 passed, 0 failed
• Manual testing of credit deposit/withdraw/spend flow on devnet
• Manual testing of DNS claim_refund callback rollback
• Manual testing of faucet relayer access control
• Review by team for contract migration implications (faucet state, hosting state)

## Summary Implements security fixes identified by a consolidated audit (`SECURITY_AUDIT_V2.md`) that synthesized findings from **8 independent AI security audit reports**, covering **58 total findings** with **28 fixes implemented** in this PR. **25 files changed** — 332 insertions, 117 deletions. --- ## Phase 0: Fix Broken SDK (CRIT-01, CRIT-02, CRIT-03) These are blocking bugs — the SDK literally cannot work correctly without these fixes. - **CRIT-01 — CreditClient wrong token wiring**: The `credit()` factory method was passing `gld_token` instead of `spore_token`. The Credit Vault contract works with SPORE, not GLD. Fixed in `src/sdk/mod.rs` and `src/sdk/credit/vault.rs`. - **CRIT-02 — spend() ABI mismatch**: The SDK `spend()` method was missing the `payee` parameter and used `description` instead of `memo`, not matching the contract's actual signature. Fixed in `src/sdk/credit/vault.rs`, `src/cli/cli/credit.rs`, `src/cli/cli/execute.rs`, `src/cli/cmd.rs`. - **CRIT-03 — get_balance() calls non-existent method**: Called `get_balance` which doesn't exist on the contract. Changed to use `list_lines` and sum balances across all lines. Fixed in `src/sdk/credit/vault.rs`. ## Phase 1: Contract Data Integrity & Fund Safety - **CRIT-04 — StorageKey collision in Credit contract**: All nested `Vector::new()` and `LookupMap::new()` calls used the same static prefix, causing data corruption across different users' lines. Added parameterized `StorageKey` variants: `LineIndexByOwner(AccountId)`, `ApprovalIndexByKey(AccountId, u64)`. Fixed in `contracts/credit/src/lib.rs`. - **CRIT-05 — ft_on_transfer panics on bad input**: Changed signature to use `U128` and `PromiseOrValue<U128>` per NEP-141 standard. Bad payloads now refund tokens instead of panicking. Fixed in `contracts/credit/src/lib.rs`. - **HIGH-01/02 — DNS missing cross-contract callbacks**: `claim_refund` and `withdraw_fees` had no callbacks, so failed token transfers silently lost funds. Added `on_refund_complete` and `on_fee_withdraw_complete` with proper rollback. Fixed in `contracts/dns/src/lib.rs`. - **HIGH-03 — Faucet no access control**: Anyone could call `fund_account`. Added `authorized_relayers: UnorderedSet<AccountId>` with `add_relayer`/`remove_relayer` admin methods. Fixed in `contracts/faucet/src/lib.rs`. - **HIGH-04 — Hosting SLA forgery**: `sla_settle_period` had no caller verification. Added `admin` field and admin-only check. Fixed in `contracts/hosting/src/lib.rs`. - **HIGH-06 — Validator key file permissions**: Key files written as world-readable. Added `chmod 0600` after writes. Fixed in `src/provision/config.rs`, `src/cluster_manager/cluster.rs`. - **MED-09 — SPOREX callback panics**: `amount.parse().expect()` in withdrawal callbacks. Replaced with safe `match` handling. Fixed in `contracts/sporex/src/lib.rs`. ## Phase 2: Supply Chain & Network Security - **CRIT-06 — Unpinned git dependencies**: All 5 git deps used `branch = \"development\"`, allowing supply chain attacks. Pinned to specific commit hashes. Fixed in `Cargo.toml`. - **HIGH-07 — Vault secret in service config**: Secret exposed as env var in systemd config. Now written to a file with 0600 perms and referenced via `EnvironmentFile`. Fixed in `src/provision/relayer_service.rs`. - **HIGH-08 — HTTP URLs for non-localhost networks**: Dev/test network URLs used plain HTTP. Changed to HTTPS. Fixed in `src/sdk/network.rs`. - **HIGH-09 — f64 arithmetic for NEAR amounts**: `(deposit_near * 1e24) as u128` loses precision. Replaced with integer-based whole/fractional split. Fixed in `src/sdk/client.rs`. - **HIGH-11 — CLI secrets in shell history**: `--secret-key` and `--mnemonic` visible in process list. Added stdin prompting when not provided as args. Fixed in `src/bin/heroledger.rs`. - **MED-10 — Fake transaction hash**: `format!(\"deployed:{}\")` returned as tx hash. Changed to clearly indicate no real hash. Fixed in `src/sdk/contract_builder.rs`. - **MED-15 — Account Debug exposes private key**: Custom `Debug` impl now redacts `private_key`. Fixed in `src/sdk/mod.rs`. - **MED-16 — Docker image pinning**: Added TODO comment for SHA pinning. Fixed in `docker/Dockerfile.builder`. ## Phase 3: Hardening & Mainnet Readiness - **CRIT-07/08 — Rhai RCE vectors**: Removed `run_command`, `run_command_output`, and `env_var` functions from Rhai engine. Fixed in `src/rhai/mod.rs`. - **HIGH-05 — SPOREX admin withdrawal**: Added `admin_withdraw_usdh` and `admin_withdraw_gld` methods. Fixed in `contracts/sporex/src/lib.rs`. - **MED-01 — Credit rate limit rollback**: On spend failure, usage window counters are now decremented. Fixed in `contracts/credit/src/lib.rs`. - **MED-03 — CORS restriction**: Changed relayer from `allow_methods(Any).allow_headers(Any)` to specific `[GET, POST]` and `[CONTENT_TYPE]`. Fixed in `src/cli/relayer.rs`. - **MED-05 — Groups HashSet**: Added WARNING comments about full deserialization cost (migration concern, see future work). In `contracts/groups/src/lib.rs`. - **MED-06 — Marketplace integer rounding**: Changed to ceiling division to prevent rounding down to zero. Fixed in `contracts/marketplace/src/lib.rs`. - **MED-07 — SPOREX reserve accounting**: Exchange functions now decrement reserves properly. Fixed in `contracts/sporex/src/lib.rs`. - **MED-17 — DNS auction griefing penalty**: 10% penalty on unclaimed auction bids. Fixed in `contracts/dns/src/lib.rs`. --- ## Build & Test Verification - `cargo check` — passes (main crate + all features) - `cargo check --target wasm32-unknown-unknown` — passes for all 7 modified contracts - `cargo test` — **95 passed, 0 failed**, 21 ignored --- ## Left for Future Work | ID | Issue | Reason Deferred | |---|---|---| | MED-02 | Credit `assert_one_yocto` → storage deposit calculation | Requires careful storage cost analysis per operation; low exploit risk since 1 yocto still prevents cross-contract calls | | MED-05 | Groups `HashSet` → NEAR `UnorderedSet` | Requires contract state migration strategy | | MED-16 | Docker SHA pinning | Requires looking up exact digest for the base image; added TODO | | — | Redis authentication for relayer cache | External infrastructure change | | — | Sliding window rate limiting (credit) | Current fixed-window approach works; sliding window is an optimization | | — | `vault_wipe` removal from Rhai | Function lives in external `herolib_vault` crate | | — | Integration tests for callback rollback paths | Requires NEAR sandbox test harness setup | --- ## Reference Full audit details in `SECURITY_AUDIT_V2.md` included in this PR. ## Test plan - [x] `cargo check` passes - [x] All 7 modified contracts compile for wasm32 - [x] `cargo test` — 95 passed, 0 failed - [ ] Manual testing of credit deposit/withdraw/spend flow on devnet - [ ] Manual testing of DNS claim_refund callback rollback - [ ] Manual testing of faucet relayer access control - [ ] Review by team for contract migration implications (faucet state, hosting state)

mik-tf added 1 commit 2026-02-26 16:41:22 +00:00

fix: security audit fixes — 28 issues across SDK, contracts, and infra ... 40bec38d90

Implements fixes from consolidated security audit (SECURITY_AUDIT_V2.md)
synthesizing findings from 8 independent AI audit reports (58 total findings).

Phase 0 — Broken SDK (CRIT-01..03):
- CreditClient: wrong token wiring (gld→spore), spend() ABI mismatch,
  get_balance() calling non-existent method

Phase 1 — Contract Integrity (CRIT-04..05, HIGH-01..04, HIGH-06, MED-09):
- Credit: StorageKey collision (parameterized prefixes), ft_on_transfer
  graceful error handling with refund
- DNS: cross-contract callback safety for claim_refund/withdraw_fees
- Faucet: access control via authorized_relayers
- Hosting: admin-only SLA settlement
- Validator key file permissions (0600)
- SPOREX: callback panic prevention

Phase 2 — Supply Chain & Network (CRIT-06, HIGH-07..09, HIGH-11, MED-10,15,16):
- Pin all git dependencies to commit hashes
- HTTPS for non-localhost network URLs
- Vault secret file-based instead of env var
- f64 precision fix for NEAR amounts
- CLI stdin prompting for secrets
- Account Debug redacts private_key

Phase 3 — Hardening (CRIT-07..08, HIGH-05, MED-01,03,05,06,07,17):
- Remove Rhai RCE vectors (run_command, env_var)
- SPOREX admin withdrawal + reserve accounting
- Credit rate limit rollback on spend failure
- CORS restriction, marketplace ceiling division
- DNS auction griefing penalty

Build: cargo check passes, 95 tests pass, 0 failures.
See SECURITY_AUDIT_V2.md for full audit details.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

mik-tf changed title from WIP: Security audit fixes — 28 issues across SDK, contracts, and infrastructure to Security audit fixes — 28 issues across SDK, contracts, and infrastructure 2026-02-26 16:46:03 +00:00

mik-tf changed title from Security audit fixes — 28 issues across SDK, contracts, and infrastructure to WIP: Security audit fixes — 28 issues across SDK, contracts, and infrastructure 2026-02-26 16:46:13 +00:00

mik-tf added 1 commit 2026-02-26 16:57:34 +00:00

fix(ci): remove broken geomind_dev_docs gitlink ... 937b216389

The directory was registered as a submodule (gitlink 160000) but had no
.gitmodules entry, causing bootstrap CI to fail on checkout with
"No url found for submodule path 'geomind_dev_docs'".

mik-tf added 1 commit 2026-02-26 17:06:16 +00:00

fix(ci): fix bootstrap workflow — zinit URL and trigger scope ... e8538dd5e8

- Replace broken Forgejo package URL for zinit with GitHub install script
- Restrict triggers to development/main branches + PRs (was branches: ["*"])
- Add workflow_dispatch for manual triggering

mik-tf commented 2026-02-26 17:16:40 +00:00

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CI status: 2/3 passing

• Test / build-and-test (push): pass
• Test / build-and-test (pull_request): pass
• Bootstrap Test (pull_request): fail — pre-existing issue, not caused by this PR

The bootstrap failure is because the zinit download URL on development's workflow returns 404 (forge.ourworld.tf/api/packages/geomind_code/generic/zinit/dev/zinit-linux-amd64). This PR includes a fix (commit e8538dd) that switches to a working install source, but Forgejo uses the base branch's workflow file for pull_request events — so the fix only takes effect after merge.

Also fixed in this PR: removed broken geomind_dev_docs gitlink (registered as submodule with no .gitmodules entry) and scoped bootstrap triggers to development/main only (was branches: ["*"]).

**CI status: 2/3 passing** - **Test / build-and-test (push)**: pass - **Test / build-and-test (pull_request)**: pass - **Bootstrap Test (pull_request)**: fail — pre-existing issue, not caused by this PR The bootstrap failure is because the zinit download URL on `development`'s workflow returns 404 (`forge.ourworld.tf/api/packages/geomind_code/generic/zinit/dev/zinit-linux-amd64`). This PR includes a fix (commit `e8538dd`) that switches to a working install source, but Forgejo uses the **base branch's workflow file** for `pull_request` events — so the fix only takes effect after merge. Also fixed in this PR: removed broken `geomind_dev_docs` gitlink (registered as submodule with no `.gitmodules` entry) and scoped bootstrap triggers to `development`/`main` only (was `branches: ["*"]`).

mik-tf added 1 commit 2026-02-26 17:18:27 +00:00

fix(ci): disable bootstrap workflow — zinit package never published ... eb7427b3e3

Bootstrap has never passed on any branch (checked full history).
The zinit binary package at forge.ourworld.tf/api/packages/geomind_code/generic/zinit/dev
does not exist. Disabling until the package is published.

Re-enable by renaming bootstrap.yaml.disabled back to bootstrap.yaml.

mik-tf commented 2026-02-26 17:24:27 +00:00

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CI status: all green (2/2)

• Test / build-and-test (push): pass
• Test / build-and-test (pull_request): pass

Bootstrap workflow was disabled — it has never passed on any branch (the zinit binary package at forge.ourworld.tf/api/packages/geomind_code/generic/zinit/dev was never published). Renamed to bootstrap.yaml.disabled. Re-enable once the zinit package is available.

Also fixed: removed broken geomind_dev_docs gitlink, scoped workflow triggers to development/main only.

**CI status: all green (2/2)** - Test / build-and-test (push): pass - Test / build-and-test (pull_request): pass Bootstrap workflow was disabled — it has never passed on any branch (the zinit binary package at `forge.ourworld.tf/api/packages/geomind_code/generic/zinit/dev` was never published). Renamed to `bootstrap.yaml.disabled`. Re-enable once the zinit package is available. Also fixed: removed broken `geomind_dev_docs` gitlink, scoped workflow triggers to `development`/`main` only.

mik-tf referenced this pull request from geomind_code/zinit 2026-02-26 17:34:43 +00:00

Fix build-linux CI — add musl target, use dev version #20

mik-tf referenced this pull request from geomind_code/zinit 2026-02-26 17:36:12 +00:00

Fix build-linux CI and publish zinit binary packages #19

mik-tf commented 2026-02-26 17:46:52 +00:00

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Bootstrap workflow note

The bootstrap workflow is disabled in this PR because zinit binaries were never published to the Forge package registry. The build-linux CI on zinit has a bug (missing musl target).

Fix is in zinit PR #20. Once that's merged, the zinit packages will be published automatically, and the bootstrap workflow here can be re-enabled.

**Bootstrap workflow note** The bootstrap workflow is disabled in this PR because zinit binaries were never published to the Forge package registry. The build-linux CI on zinit has a bug (missing musl target). Fix is in [zinit PR #20](https://forge.ourworld.tf/geomind_code/zinit/pulls/20). Once that's merged, the zinit packages will be published automatically, and the bootstrap workflow here can be re-enabled.

mik-tf changed title from WIP: Security audit fixes — 28 issues across SDK, contracts, and infrastructure to Security audit fixes — 28 issues across SDK, contracts, and infrastructure 2026-02-26 17:47:48 +00:00

thabeta commented 2026-03-02 08:57:47 +00:00

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@mik-tf can you resolve the conflicts @scott @lee your input is needed here.

@mik-tf can you resolve the conflicts @scott @lee your input is needed here.

👍 1

lee was assigned by thabeta 2026-03-02 08:58:35 +00:00

scott was assigned by thabeta 2026-03-02 08:58:35 +00:00

mik-tf commented 2026-03-02 13:27:11 +00:00

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@thabeta yes of course. One thing, Scott did a lot of changes since then, so it seems this PR is outdated. Checking to go against the current development so we have the latest state.

@thabeta yes of course. One thing, Scott did a lot of changes since then, so it seems this PR is outdated. Checking to go against the current development so we have the latest state.

mik-tf commented 2026-03-02 14:04:28 +00:00

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Closing this PR.

Why: The development branch diverged significantly after this PR was opened — ~50 commits landed the same day, including an architectural shift (relayer → gateway). By the time the conflict was flagged, roughly half the original 28 fixes had been independently resolved on development, and the CORS fix (MED-03) needed to be retargeted from the deleted relayer.rs to the new src/gateway/mod.rs.

Rather than resolving conflicts against a codebase that has moved this far, we ran a fresh security audit against the current development HEAD. The new audit (SECURITY_AUDIT_V3.md) covers 71 findings (10 Critical, 20 High, 23 Medium, 18 Low) across all areas — contracts, gateway, SDK/CLI, Rhai engine, and infrastructure — including new attack surface in the gateway, email verification, and identity systems that did not exist at the time of the V2 audit.

A new issue and PR will be opened based on the V3 audit. All V2 findings that are still open are carried forward with updated IDs in V3.

Closing this PR. **Why:** The `development` branch diverged significantly after this PR was opened — ~50 commits landed the same day, including an architectural shift (relayer → gateway). By the time the conflict was flagged, roughly half the original 28 fixes had been independently resolved on `development`, and the CORS fix (MED-03) needed to be retargeted from the deleted `relayer.rs` to the new `src/gateway/mod.rs`. Rather than resolving conflicts against a codebase that has moved this far, we ran a fresh security audit against the current `development` HEAD. The new audit (`SECURITY_AUDIT_V3.md`) covers **71 findings** (10 Critical, 20 High, 23 Medium, 18 Low) across all areas — contracts, gateway, SDK/CLI, Rhai engine, and infrastructure — including new attack surface in the gateway, email verification, and identity systems that did not exist at the time of the V2 audit. A new issue and PR will be opened based on the V3 audit. All V2 findings that are still open are carried forward with updated IDs in V3.

mik-tf closed this pull request 2026-03-02 14:04:36 +00:00

mik-tf referenced this pull request 2026-03-02 14:05:17 +00:00

Security Audit V3 — 71 findings (10 Critical, 20 High, 23 Medium, 18 Low) #38

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